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is ~coming increasingly popular to assert that
money growth cannot be controlled and, therefore,
that monetary policy should stop targeting monetary
growth and try to control other variables that may
affect economic activity and the rate of inflation. Many
argue that, although excessive long-run monetary
growth is clearly the dominant cause of inflation, at-
tempts to control it are so weak and uncertain that
they create more problems than benefits. Even casual
observation seems to support these arguments: in
the United States, the Federal Reserve System has
announced monetary growth targets since 1973, but
has achieved only questionable success in reaching
them; in many foreign countries, such as the United
Kingdom and Germany, targets were established, but
were either persistently or occasionally violated; in
Switzerland, monetary control has been successful,
but is viewed as an aberration due to the country’s
small size and other uniquely favorable conditions.
For most of the ‘70s, this lack of success was caused
by the monetary authorities’ desire to simultane-
ously stabilize short-term interest rates and control
money growth. Whenever interest rate and money
growth targets became inconsistent, most central
banks preferred to abandon money growth targets,
producing erratic and generally excessive monetary
growth. In October 1979, however, the Federal Re-
serve heralded a change in operating procedure,
announcing that it would place more emphasis on the
control of monetary aggregates as opposed to the sta-
bilization of the federal funds rate.1 Still, during 1980,
U.S. money growth turned out to be both considerably
more erratic and somewhat higher than originally
desired.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many analysts
have become convinced that a monetary policy de-
signed to stabilize the growth of monetary aggregates
is neither desirable nor achievable.2 This criticism
usually has taken four separate lines of thought:
1. Money growth doesn’t matter. The relationship
between the growth of gross national product
1The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository
mstitutions borrow reserves from each other.
2”The Pitfalls of Mechanical Monetarism,” The Morgan Guar-
anty Survey (February 1981), pp. 8-13.
(whose steady expansion is the ultimate goal of
any macroeconomic stabilization policy) and
monetary growth is too variable; successful con-
trol of monetary growth cannot mitigate fluctu-
ations in economic activity and the rate of
inflation.
2. Money growth does matter, but should not be
controlled because it would cause greater vola-
tility in other crucial economic variables (such
as interest or exchange rates). This, in turn,
would produce economic disruptions far worse
than those created by rapid and erratic money
growth.
3. Monetary base growth doesn’t matter. The rela-
tionship between the monetary base (which con-
sists of bank reserves and currency held by the
public, and which the central bank can control
directly) and the quantity of money in the
economy is both highly variable and unpredict-
able; tight control of the base will not produce
stable growth of money.
4. Monetary base growth cannot be controlled. This
is so, either because the central bank must sup-
ply currency on demand or because some of the
Federal Reserve balance sheet items are deter-
mined by transactions outside its control. Since
base growth underlies money growth, money
growth cannot be controlled.
Assertions 1 and 2 address the issue whether mone-
tary growth should be controlled; there is a substantial
body of literature already dealing with the issue.3
How Controllable is Money Growth?
3Examples of literature dealing with the relationships between
money growth and income growth include: Milton Friedman,
ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1956); Lyle E. Cramley and Samuel
13. Chase, Jr., “Time Deposits in Monetary Analysis,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin (October 1965), pp. 1380-1404; Karl Brun-
ncr and Allan H. Meltzer, “Predicting Velocity: Implications
for Theory and Policy,” Journal of Finance (May 1963), pp.
319-54; Bryon Higgins and V. Vance Roley, “Monetary Policy
and Economic Performance: Evidence From Single Equation
Models,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Review (January 1979), pp. 3-12; Charles B. Nelson, “Recur-
sive Structure in U.S. Income, Prices and Output,” Journal of
Political Economy (December 1979), pp. 1307-27; Leonall
C. Anderson and Keith M. Carlson, “A Monetarist Model for
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (December 1979), pp.
3-14.
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This article addresses the question whether monetary
growth can be controlled and thus deals with asser-
tions 3 and 4 above.
What is Money and How is it Created?
Money is usually defined as those objects that are
generally acceptedin payment for goods, services and
debts. In the United States, these consist of currency
and checkable deposits.~This definition of the money
stock, which excludes U.S. Treasury and interbank
deposits, is referred to as M1B. It consists of currency
and checkable deposits in the hands of the private
nonbank public, and state and local governments.
When the public wants more money, it obtains it
from those institutions whose liabilities are acceptable
as money. These consist of commercial banks, whose
liabilities include demand deposits, autpmatic trans-
fer accounts (ATS) and negotiable orders of with-
drawal (NOW); thrift institutions, which issue NOW
accounts; and credit unions, which issue credit union
share drafts. Federal Reserve Banks, whose liabilities
also include money, do not deal with the public and,
therefore, do not directly contribute to the creation
of money.
When the public as a whole desires more money
(and the monetary authorities supply the necessary
reserves), it sells a variety of assets, including promis-
sory notes (i.e., loans) to the banking system as a
whole (all private institutions whose liabilities are
money), receiving payment in currency or in check-
able deposits. As these receipts are spent and respent,
a portion winds up as someone’s currency holdings or
checkable deposits, and the money stock will increase.
It is crucial to understand, however, that an in-
crease in loans by the banking system does not neces-
sarily result in an increase in the money stock. For
example, if an individual puts $100 from his checking
account into his savings account, thus decreasing the
stock of money by $100, and the bank lends the re-
sulting excess reserves to a second individual who
adds it to his checkable deposits, thus increasing the
money stock, bank loans and the total amount of
credit will have increased, but not the money stock.5
t
Time deposits or money market mutual fund shares are not
money since they cannot be spent without conversion into
currency or checkable deposits. Credit cards represent either
existing checkable deposits or deposits that will be created
by a bank.
5
1f one were to deposit currency into a savings account, the re-
sultant increase in excess reserves would cause an expansion
of loans and money. But loans would increase by more.
Although the expansion of loans by the banking sys-
tem is the mechanism through which the money stock
increases, not all loans result in money growth.
Since bank loans and investments are a source of
bank profits, and since banks are profit-maximizing
institutions, we should and do observe that they make
loans to the full extent that they are able. What
then constrains their ability to make loans and ex-
pand the stock of money?
Bank Reserves and Their Role in
Money Creation
In the United States, all financial institutions that
create checking deposits are legally required to hold
reserves against these deposits either in their vaults or
in accounts with Federal Reserve Banks. These reserve
requirements are imposed as a percentage of various
deposits. Thus, if the average reserve requirement is
10 percent and the banking system wished to create
new checkable deposits of $100, it must obtain re-
serves of $10. Since both currency and deposits with
Federal Reserve Banks are Federal Reserve liabilities,
the banking system can obtain reserves by selling
securities to, or borrowing from, the Federal Reserve
System.
In principle, the Federal Reserve could always re-
fuse to buy securities or to make loans. It would thus
restrict the availability of reserves and the banking
system’s ability to create new checkable deposits.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve can buy securities at
an attractive price or make loans on attractive terms,
inducing the banking system to acquire excess re-
serves.6 Since excess reserves do not produce income
for the bank’s stockholders, banks will expand their
loans, creating deposits and adding to the money
stock.
Currency in the hands of the nonbank public repre-
sents another source of bank reserves which may also
account for the expansion of the money stock. For
example, if an individual deposits $100 in currency
into his checking account, the bank’s vault cash (part
of its reserves) rises by $100. Because the bank must
hold only $10 as a reserve for the newly created $100
of deposits, it now has $90 of excess reserves with
which to expand its loans and deposits. Thus, the con-
straint on monetary expansion is not only the avail-
ability of bank reserves (deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks and vault cash), but also the amount of cur-
°Excessreserves are reserves over and above required reserves.
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rency in the hands of the public. The sum of these
two is referred to as the monetary base.7 It will be
viewed as the constraining magnitude of bank de-
posit expansion or contraction for the remainder of
this article.
Problems in Controlling the Monetary Base
and Money Growth
The discussion so far seemingly implies that con-
trol of money growth is a relatively simple matter.
Since the monetary base is a liability of the Federal
Reserve System, it can be tightly controlled by the
System; since monetary expansion is dependent on the
availability of monetary base, money growth can be
expected to follow a desired path. Yet much of the
criticism leveled at monetary policy rests on the prem-
ise that money growth cannot be controlled.
Given the prior description of the mechanics of
money creation, monetary control problems will exist
only if the monetary base cannot be controlled with
sufficient precision or, given a specific path of mone-
tary base growth, if money growth is unpredictable.
For instance, analysts often argue that many items on
the Federal Reserve balance sheet vary with the va-
garies of bank and public behavior. Or, that the rela-
tionship between the monetary base and the money
stock is so volatile, that even if the monetary base is
controlled, money growth will refuse to behave in
the desired manner.
It is true, of course, that the use of an additional
dollar of reserves is deter-mined by banks and the
public. Banks, through their willingness to hold excess
reserves, and the public, through its willingness to
hold currency, time deposits or checkable deposits,
both affect the amount of money created out of each
additional dollar of reserves.
Whether these are serious problems is an empirical
issue. If the Federal Reserve System cannot control
certain items on its balance sheet, can it offset these
items with relative ease? If bank and public decisions
can vary substantially, do they in fact do so? Are these
changes offsetting? Are they predictable? These ques-
tions must be answered before one can decide if
money stock control is impossible.
Control of the Monetary Base
A simplified balance sheet of the Federal Reserve
System is shown in table 1.
Because the balance sheet must balance, it can be
rewritten as:
Monetary base = Gold certificates
+ Foreign currencies
+ Security holdings




— Foreign central bank deposits
— Other liabilities and capitaL
Any change in the monetary base must equal the
change in the sum of all other items. Thus, the con-
trol of the monetary base depends upon the ability to
control the sum of the remaining items.
Consider, first, those items that change only at the
discretion of the Federal Reserve:
(a) Foreign currencies
(b) Security holdings
(c) Loans to financial institutions
(d) Other assets
(e) Other liabilities and capital.
Clearly, the Federal Reserve can decide the amount
of foreign currencies or securities it wishes to buy or
sell.8 It can decide, except as a lender of last resort
in a national liquidity crisis, the amount that it will
7
For more detailed discussions of the definition and use of the
monetary base, see Karl Brunner and Allan 11. Meltzer, - A
Credit Market Theory of the Money Supply and an Explana-
tion of Two Puzzles in U.S. Monetary Policy, Essays in
Honour of Marco Fanno, (Padua, Italy: Cedam, 1966), pp
151-76; Karl Bmnner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Some Further
Investigations of Demand and Supply Functions for Money,
The Journal of Finance (May 1964), pp. 240-83; Albert E.
Burger, The Money Supply Process (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971); and Anatol B. Balbach and
Albert E. Burger, “Derivation of the Monetary Base,” this
Review (November 1976), pp. 2-8.
8
0f course, there are those who maintain that since sales and
purchases of foreign currencies temporarily affect foreign ex-
change rates, and since sales and purchases of securities, in-
cluding bank promissory notes, temporarily affect interest
rates, the Federal Reserve is not free to eagage in these trans-
actions at will. But this is irrelevant to the issue whether the
Fedensl Reserve can control the monetary base. These arguments
would be relevant in a discussion whether the Federal Reserve
should control monetary base and money growth, as contrasted
with control of exchange and interest rates, but it is of no
concem here.
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Table 1
Simplified Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
(in millions of dollars)
Assets Liabilities
Net Net
Average averaqe Average average
Level weekly weekly Level weekly weekly
Nov. 5, variation variation Nov. 5, variation variation
1980 in1980 in1980 1980 in1980 in1980
Gold certificates $ 11.163 $ .28 $—.21 Monetary base:
Foreign currencies 3.158 103 50 Deposits of financial
institutions $ 33,177 $3,510 $-142
Federal Reserve credit: Federal Reserve
Security holdings 130.674 3.271 36 notes 119,416 563 207
Loans to financial Treasury deposits 3,064 746 -. 17
institutions 3,371 1,777 — 5 Foreign central
bank deposits 236 59 .62
Float 5,217 1,271 83 Other liabilities
Other assets 7,235 267 22 and capital 4.922 257 28
lend to financial institutions.0 And it can certainly official transactions in gold, this account is virtually
control the other assets it wishes to acquire and the dormant.
other liabilities it wishes to incur.’° -
Float represents an mterest-free loan from the Fed-
eral Reserve to financial institutions. It arises from the
time difference between the Federal Reserve sched-
ule for crediting banks for checks in the collection
process and the actual flow of checks. Once the check
is deposited and placed in the clearing system, the
payee’s bank is credited with a deposit on a certain
schedule. If the payer’s bank is not yet debited wit]iiu
that same scheduled time, the banking system has
more reserves until the check actually clears. Thus,
the level of float fluctuates with transportation, com-
puting and other problems. Fluctuations in Treasury
and foreign central bank deposits result from Treasury
and foreign central bank decisions, just as individuals’
bank deposits are affected by their decisions.
°Itis frequently argued that because of lagged reserve account- The controllability of the monetary base depends
ing, in any given week the Federal Reserve must make loans primarily on the fluctuations of these nondiscretionary
to financial institutions if they are deficient in required re-
serves. This indeed has been the tradition. But to say that accountsand the degree to which the Federal Reserve
this is necessary assumes that there are no deficiency and can offset these fluctuations through changes in its
th~en
5
inOi loans must be based, arn~org other thin discretionary accounts. In other words, are weekly
on the availability of reserves, If such an argument is pushed changes in nondiscretionary accounts sufficiently great
then the central bank has no control that they cannot be offset by transactions in discre-
tionary accounts? 10
Other assets are the sum of: special drawing rights certifi-
~~ aPt- In table 1, column 1 shows the dollar amounts for
laneous assets. Other liabilities are the sum of: deposits of each of the accounts in the week ending November
internaionlorganizations, the~Exchan~e Sta~,ilizaticoFund 5, 1980. Colunm 2 shows the average absolute weekly
crued dividends and payahles, and capital accounts, variation in each of the accounts during 1980. Column
Balance sheet items that are not subject to Fed-




(d) Foreign central bank deposits.
Gold certificates are issued by the U.S. Treasury and
must be bought by the Federal Reserve System. When-
ever the gold stock changes, the Treasury issues or
withdraws gold certificates at some prescribed official
price. Since, for the past decade, there have been few
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Table 2
Annual Movements in the M1B Multiplier
Average Difference
level of Year-to-year Maximum Minimum between
monthly changes of multiplier multiplier maximum
Year Ml B multiplier column 1 in the year in the year and minimum
1970 2.913 2.950 2.891 .059
1971 2.881 —.032 2.900 2.862 .038
1972 2.875 --.006 2.897 2.862 .035
1973 2.852 .023 2.891 2.822 .069
1974 2.763 .089 2.817 2.706 .111
1975 2.685 —.078 2.711 2.649 .068
1916 2.636 .049 2.615 2.612 .063
1977 2.622 —.014 2.840 2.806 .034
1978 2.596 -.028 2.619 2.583 .035
1979 2.583 —.013 2.599 2.568 .031
1980 2.543 -.040 2.573 2.504 .069
1970-79 Average ‘-- —.037 Average ‘ .061
of the monetary base will he uscd. The hanldng sys-
tem may hold it as excess reserves or lend it to bor-
rowers. The public may hold all of the newly gener-
ated loans in time deposits, or as currency or check-
able deposits. Each of these decisions affect money
growth differently. The magnitude that describes the
net result of these decisions is referred to as the mone-
tary base multiplier and is measured by the ratio of
the money stock to the monetary base.12 If the multi-
plier is highly variable and unpredictable, then a tight
control of the monetary base may still produce highly
variable money growth. As an example, let us look at accounts may vary all in one direction, thus produc- .. .
-. . the variabihty of this multiplier, and what it would mg a need for large cumulative offsetting transactions.
have unphed about money growth m 1980.
The average net weekly variation in the sum of non-
discretionary accounts was a decrease of $71 million, Table 2 shows the annual behavior of the monetary
again, a trivial change in the Fed’s security portfolio.11 base multiplier from 1970 to 1980. Column 1 lists an-
This discussion demonstrates that the Federal Re- nual average levels of the monthly multiplier, column
serve can control the monetary base even on a weekly 2 presents year-to-year changes of these averages, col-
basis if it so desires. There is, of course no question umns 3 and 4 show the maximum and minimum levels
that it can do so over longer periods of time. of the monthly multiplier in any given year, and col-
umn 5 lists the differences between these maximum
and minimum levels. Does Control of the Monetary Base Imply
Suppose that M1B is $384.8 billion in the fourth
quarter of 1979, and we want it to grow at a 5.5 per-
As indicated previously, the banking system and the
nonbanking public decide how each additional dollar
i2Thls can be expressed as M = mB, where M and B are the
levels of M1B and monetary base, respectively, and m is
‘-
1
The Federal Reserve knows its daily balance sheet with a the monetary base multiplier. It is clear from this relation-
one-day lag. Thus, knowledge of changes in noudiscretionary ship that if m is stable or predictable, control of monetary
accounts can initiate offsetting transactions the next day. base implies control of the money stock.
3 depicts the average weekly net variation (where
decreases are subtracted from increases).
The Federal Reserve’s ability to offset variations in
nondiscretionaiy accounts on a weekly basis depends
on the variability of the sum of all nondiscretionary
accounts. In 1980 this sum varied on average, in abso-
lute terms, $1,409 million per week. Since the average
weekly absolute variation in security holdings alone
was $3,271 million, it is clear that changes in nondis-
cretionary accounts can be easily offset. Moreover, one
need not be concerned that these nondiscretionary
Control of Money Growth?
7FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1981
Table 3
MiS Growth Resulting from Injection of Constant Amounts ot Base
(billions of dollars)
Resultant Resultant Ml B Actual MlB
Desired Resultant MIS rowth rate rowth rate
MiS base Actual levels 9
Month levels levels multiplier monthly monthly quarterly monthly quarterly
January $3882 $15-LIe 2.573 $388.9 84% 44%
February 390.0 151 99 2573 391 1 7.0 5.7% iao 5.8%
March 391.7 15282 2.555 390.5 1.8 0 6
April 8933 153.55 2.517 386.7 11 1 —14,0
May 395.2 15448 2.504 886.8 0.8 2,0 —06 —2.4
June 3970 155,31 2.516 391 1 142 17.4
July 398.8 15614 2.526 394.4 10,8 1&7
August 4006 156.97 2.546 3996 170 11.8 24.2 155
September 402.4 157.80 2556 403.3 11.7 17.0
October 4042 15863 2.567 407.2 122 12,4
November 406.0 15946 2552 4083 —03 7.6 91 11 3
December 4073 160.29 2535 406.3 -tB -83
Resultartt MIS growth rate. 4th quarter 1979 through 4th quarter 1980 51 percent
Actual MIS growth rate 4th quarter 1979 through 4th quarter 1980 7.3 percent
cent annual rate. This means that M1B should equal ated in the same manner as it actually did in 1950.13
$406 billion in the fourth quarter of 1980, an increase
What would have been the resulting growth of of $21.2 billion. How much monetary base should be
M1B? Table 3 shows the resulting levels of mone- supplied in order to achieve this growth? Consider the
tary base, the resulting levels of M1B (which are results obtained by using two alternative, simple and
computed by multiplying the base level by the actual mec anistic procedures. In the first procedure, mone-
monthly multiplier) and the resultmg monthly and
tary base is supplied at a constant monthly rate; in
quarterly annualized rates of growth of Mill. For
we second, monetary base growth varies each month
to achieve a monthly MlB growth of 5.5 percent (at ?ompanson~the actual monthly and quarterly annual-
an annual rate). ized rates of growth of M1B in 1980 are also shown.
This procedure would have resulted in a fourth-
quarter-to-fourth-quarter M1B growth of 5.7 percent,
a shade above the desired growth of 5.5 percent in-
Procedure I: Monetary Base Grows at
Constant Amount Each Month laSome analysts allege that one cannot assume that the mul-
tiplier would have been the same as it actually existed. They
Table 2 indicates that the avera e multiplier in argue that tight control of the monetary base would have producedmuch larger fluctuations in interest rates, thus affect-
1979 was 2.583, and that over the past 10 years, the ing bank and the public’s behavior, which in turn affects the
multiplier declined on average 1w 037. Thus let us multiplier. Thus, the multiplier would have been much more
• ‘ volatile. One cannot reject this argument out of hand; however, guess that the multiplier will be 2.546 (2.583 — .037) interest rate fluctuations in 1980 were as large as any exper-
for 1980. We would, therefore want monetary base to ienced over a similar period of time, and the snultipher re-
mained remarkably stable. Until a base stabilization procedure grow to a level of $159.5 billion ($406.0 billion/2.546) is put into effect, there is no empirical evidence to support
in the fourth quarter of 1980. Thistranslates to monthly the assertion that the multiplier would be more volatile. For a
contrary view, see David Lindsey and Others, Monetary Con- growth of the base of $830 million in 1980. Let us trol Experience Under the New Operating Procedures, New
further assume that the multiplier, instead of remain- Monetary Control Procedures, Federal Reserve Stall Study,
Volume II (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- ing constant at its guessed value of 2.546, fiuctu- tem, February 1981).
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Chart 1
Levels of MW Resulting from
Monetary Control Procedure I
JAN, FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.
1980
Latest data plottedt December
stead of the actual 1980 growth ~of 7.3 percent (see
chart 1) u This indicates that although the multiplier
may fluctuate from month to month, it remains rela-
tively stable and predictable on a yearly average basis.
14
Comparisons with actual money growth should not assume
that Federal Reserve actions also aimed at 5.5 percent M1B
growth (close to the midpoint of the 4-6.5 percent range) -
The Federal Reserve could have aimed at 6.5 percent or 4
percent; or, after assumed adjustments for shifts into ATS
and NOW accounts, at 7,25 or 425 percent; or, anywhere
in between.
Even such a simple monetary base control procedure
would have allowed for the relatively tight control of
money growth over a year.u1
1~
1tshould be noted, however, that as table 2 indicates, the
change in the multiplier from 1979 to 1980 was very close
to the average. Our predictions of the multiplier and re-
sultant money growth would not have been as successful in
1972 or 1974 (in those years this procedure would have
produced M1B growth of 6.6 percent
spectively ) - Nevertheless, this simple
would have avoided the cumulative
growth that actually occurred.
and 3.5 percent, re-
procedure, if used,
increases in money
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Table 4
M1B Growth Resulting from Injection of Varying Amounts of Base (billions of dollars)
Resultant MiB Actual M1B
growth rate growth rate Desired Base Resultant Actual Resultant -.. —.___________________________
Month M1B levels injections base levels multiplier M1B levels monthly quarterly monthly quarterly
January $388.2 $ 0.52 $150.82 2.573 $388.0 3.5% 4.4%
February 390.0 0.75 151.57 2.573 390.0 6.4 4.4% 10.0 5.8%
March 391.7 0.66 152.23 2.555 389.0 3.0 —0.6
April 393.5 1.78 154.01 2.517 367.6 —4.2 -14.0
May 395.2 3.00 157.01 2.504 393.2 18.6 4.5 -0.6 —2.4
June 397.0 1.54 158.55 2.518 399.2 19.9 17.4
July 398.8 —0.17 158.38 2.526 400.1 2.7 13.7
August 400.6 0.21 158.59 2.546 403.8 11.7 9.8 24.2 15.5
September 402.4 —0.54 158.05 2.556 404.0 0.6 17.0
October 404.2 0.09 158.14 2.567 405.9 5.8 12.4
November 406.0 0.02 158.16 2.552 403.6 6.6 2.3 9.1 11.3
December 407.8 1.64 159.80 2.535 405.1 4.6 —8.6
Resultant MIB growth rate: 4th quarter 1979 through 4th quarter 1980 ~--‘ 5.2 percent
Actual MiS growth rate: 4th quarter 1979 through 4th quarter 1980- 7.3 percent
What about money growth fluctuations within the monetary base. This level is determined using iast
year? While most economists agree that month-to- month’s multiplier. In effect, this procedure requires
month fluctuations in money growth have no impact that we attempt to return to the desired money growth
on economic activity, some believe that quarterly path each month. As before, for comparison, we will
fluctuations do. Using this criterion, Procedure I assume that actual monthly levels of the multiplier in
did not produce an appreciably better performance. 1980 would have prevailed.
Neither monthly nor quarterly money growth result-
ing from supplying a constant amount of base would Table 4 and Chart 2 present the results. The amount
have been substantially smoother than actually Iran- of monthly base injection was calculated as follows:
spired during ig8o.i~ In January the desired level of M1B was $388.2 bil-
lion; in December 1979 the multiplier was 2.574. Thus,
the level of base in January should be $150.82 billion
Procedure II: Adjusting Multiplier ($388.2/2.574), an injection of $520 million. This cal-
Estimates Monthly culation was repeated for every subsequent month,
Let us assume again that we want money to grow at thus determining the appropriate injection of mone-
the same annual rate as before. In the first procedure, tary base. The resulting monthly M1B growth again
we assumed that the multiplier would remain con- is not substantially better than the actual 1980 out-
stant over the year and, thus we supplieda constant come, but the quarterly growth is significantly more
stable. Moreover the annual M1B growth would have amount of monetary base each month. Suppose, m-
been 5.2 nercent instead of the desired 5.5 percent
stead, we assume that next months multiplier will be 17
exactly as it was last month and that we want to have and actual 7.3 percent.
M1B grow at a 5.5 percent annual rate each month. Here, if the multiplier had varied exactly as it ac-
For each month we must now calculate an appropriate tually did in 1980, a simple and “mechanistic” base
level of M1B, then supply a corresponding level of control procedure would have produced a significantly
161n this procedure, the standard deviation of MIB growth de-
clines from 1980 actual by 26 percent on a monthly basis ~~Sthndard deviation of MIB growth declines 26 percent on
and by 25 percent on a quarterly basis, a monthly basis and 59 percent on a quarterly basis.
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Chart 2
Levels of M1B Resulting from
Monetary Control Procedure II
Billions of dollars Billions of dollars
420 420










closer achievement of annual targets and significantly
more stability during the year.
Summary and Conclusions
It has been argued widely that, although excessive
monetary growth is a cause of inflation, the light
“mechanistic” control of monetary aggregates is in-
feasible. This argument is based on allegations that
the monetary base cannot be controlled, or that the
base multiplier is too variable for the
control monetary growth, particularly
nods of time.
JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.
central bank to
over short pe-
This article examines this argument by describing
the mechanics of money creation, the constraints on
money creation and the central bank’s ability to im-
pose these constraints. It demonstrates that the basic
constraint on money growth — the monetary base —
can be controlled with precision. Nondiscretionary ac-
counts in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet are much
11FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1981
smaller, and vary less, than those which it can control
directly.
The assertion that control of monetary growth is
impossible because the monetary base multiplier be-
haves erratically is examined by using two simple and
“mechanistic” monetary base control procedures and
applying them to actual multiplier variations of 1980.
Since the multiplier varied more in 1980 than it had
on average over the past 11 years, such a simulation
constitutes a reasonable test. The results indicate that
by using base control and making no adjustmentsdur-
ing the year, annual growth targets could have been
achieved with greater precision although money
growth stability dvring the year could have been im-
proved only slightly. When simple adjustments were
permitted, annual targets would have been reached
with a lower error and greater stability. Since there
are several more sophisticated monetary control pro-
cedures in existence than the two presented here, an
even better method of money growth control can be
developed.18
The article does not discuss whether tight control
of the monetary base would produce larger variability
in credit or other markets. However, if control of infla-
tion is the paramount goal of the central bank, per-




See for example, James M. Johannes and Robert H. Rasche,
“Predicting the Money Multiplier,” Journal of Monetary
Economics (July 1979), pp. 301-25, and Albert E. Burger,
Lioaell Kalish III, and Christopher T. Bnbb, “Money Stock
Control and Its Implications for ~cfonetary Policy,” this
Review (October 1971), pp. 7-22.
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